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1. INTRODUCTION 
If there were just one person in charge of World or European air traffic control (ATC), 
who had all the money, made all the decisions, project managed all the 
implementation of new technology and procedures, etc, then life would be easy and 
the future would be simple.  But there is not such a person.  There are several 
different kinds of ‘rational actor’ in this drama; actually groups of people each having 
very similar interests.  They are termed rational because they make decisions in 
what appears – to them – to be a rational manner.  So how does this affect the 
development of ATC? 
2. THE PROBLEM 
The following deals only with en route ATC, ie away from airports and their special 
equipment and procedures.  The concern here is with the strategic future of the ‘Air 
Traffic Management (ATM) system’ rather than marginal progressive changes to the 
present arrangements. 
 
The problem is:  
• There is an ATM system now 
• It is not perfect. 
• Present problems are projected to get much worse with increased traffic. 
• What should the future ATM system in 10-20 years be like? 
• How are the transitions going to be made?  What are the steps involved? 
• Who has to be persuaded – and how? – about what to do to make the 
transition steps 
 
The key thing to remember is that the ATM system is there to prevent mid-air 
collisions.  It does that by imposing certain system constraints on flights.  In simple 
terms, these are: 
• Controllers use flight plan data and radar to keep aircraft apart by minimum 
separation distances horizontally and vertically. 
• Aircraft fly largely fixed routes through controllers’ blocks of airspace 
(sectors), rather than direct flight paths, so that the number of potential conflict 
points is reduced. 
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• This enables the mental workload on controllers to be minimized. 
• But there are still limits on the hourly traffic that a controller can handle in a 
given airspace sector if workload is to be kept acceptably safe. 
Three unpleasant and sizable ATM by-products are manifested: 
A: Direct costs to users of supplying ATC 
B: Extra flightpath distances – and hence costs – from indirect routeing 
C: Delays caused by demand/capacity mismatches – and hence costs 
The future ATM system, denoted here as the scenario, has to do something about 
the total of the costs A to C – termed here the ‘ATC-related costs’. 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is said to produce rational decisions about options to 
deal with such things.  But it is a particular kind of rationality.  Thus, there are pluses 
and minuses, which can be costed and combined through as specific calculation 
scheme, generally focusing on flows of hard cash.  The CBA-orientated decision-
maker may look far into the future, but still keeps a close watch on his/her wallet. 
3. RATIONAL ACTORS 
The following descriptions of rational actors are based on fact and observations of 
behaviour.  There is some interpretation and supposition: ‘If I were in their shoes, 
how would I make judgements?’  The actors covered are airlines, ATC providers 
(and Economic Regulators), Controllers, R&D, Industry, Safety Analysts, ICAO, 
Government, and European Planning.  There are others – pilots, obviously. 
Airlines 
Airlines generally do not make big profits.  They often go out of business in the 
industry troughs and because of cutthroat competition.  They have tough 
shareholders and bankers.  So they pay very close attention to real money flows – 
‘hard cash’.  They do not take a long-term view: payback on investment, perhaps no 
more than a couple of years ahead. 
 
They want to be safe.  But they will want proof that new safety technology 
significantly reduces risks.  They will want to see the safety and financial sums.  
They prefer to see such technology mandated by ICAO, so that their competitors 
face the same cost burdens. 
 
They are happy to introduce new technology to save ATC-related costs.  But they 
have had bad experiences in the past.  They were told that new area navigational 
equipment (‘RNAV’) would provide them with direct routeings – but it generally did 
not.  They do not like what they have heard so far about satellite systems such as 
Galileo, because they seem largely to be technology-focused rather than offering 
means of reducing ATC-related costs. 
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Airlines have become increasingly careful in their dealings with ATC providers.  They 
have usually seen the costs of ATC going up.  They have often seen investment 
projects cost far more than promised and several years late.  Many feel that ATC 
providers have been sheltered from the real commercial world. 
ATC Providers (and Economic Regulators) 
ATC providers are increasingly viewed as commercial businesses.  In practice, they 
are monopolies, regulated in different ways in different states.  The European Single 
Sky is intended to introduce ‘more rational’ airspace designs, not necessarily 
bounded by states’ borders.  This potentially could lead to competition by ATC 
providers for pieces of airspace, possibly on a franchised basis.   
 
There is already pressure on ATC providers for ‘financial transparency’ and the 
performance of each ATC provider is being compared – benchmarked – with others 
in Europe and with the USA.  This leads to pressure on staff costs and induces some 
cooperation between states on development work.  However, the pressure is 
generally on current cost-efficiency rather than innovation to produce a cost-effective 
future ATM system.  Regulatory methods, eg the use of ‘Price Index – x’ processes 
for ATC charges, tend to assume that the key aim is marginal (in the economic 
sense) improvement.  This includes better use of resources, staff efficiencies and 
‘risk free’ investment programmes, mainly consisting of replacements and ‘slightly 
better functionality’ upgrades.   
 
In the regulatory literature, there is very little on any linkages between ‘Price Index – 
x’ and strategic innovation.  On investment, the regulatory focus generally tends to 
be on cash flow analysis rather than strategic issues, so again short-term 
improvement tends to be favoured over long-term innovation. 
Controllers 
The word ‘controllers’ here means operational controllers, who plan or control daily 
traffic flows.  Controllers are generally in secure jobs with reasonable salaries and 
pensions; and with shift work hours being tightly regulated.  Their skills are not 
readily transferable outside the ATC field, so comparatively few leave to do other 
things.   
 
The prime factor in determining the capacity of a specific en route sector is actually 
the mental workload of the controller.  He or she has to process and retain 
information on flights whilst maintaining the mental picture of potential conflicts 
between flights.   
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Controllers would not be expected to rush to implement things that would put them 
out of a job.  Nor would they be expected to rush to implement changes that de-skill 
their role.  This is a problem with computer assistance: if the controller is presented 
with a proposed conflict solution then where is the skill in just agreeing to it?  Given 
the necessary information, the software can find solutions to routeing problems that 
are going to be as good if not better than the controller’s.  [This may require some 
kind of ‘expert system’, which distils the rules of thumb and strategies used by expert 
controllers.]  If the controller’s job if just to sit and watch the screen until something 
peculiar happens – which would happen less and less frequently as computer 
systems are bedded in – then the job becomes rather tedious. 
R&D 
There are programmes of ATM-related Research and Development (R&D) in ATC 
providers, Eurocontrol, universities, government-sponsored research organisations, 
and aircraft manufacturers.  R&D staff want to see their products implemented – but 
also want to explore many possibilities in depth. 
 
The strategic goal is to find ways of reducing the increasing costs A to C, noted at 
the very beginning.  This means that the concept of ‘control’ must be changed.  The 
main aim is to tackle the present system constraints – the ‘workload bottleneck’ – 
that lead to the unpleasant ATM by-products.  This has to be some combination of: 
• Transfer of control/separation tasks to pilots 
• Reduction of workload by computer assistance, eg displaying potential 
routeings and/or conflicts 
• Elimination of tasks by major redesign/transferring them to computer software 
None of these is painless: at the very least, aircraft need new kit or ground 
computers new software.  One of the major issues is the extent to which information 
from the aircraft’s computer systems – which increasingly contain data about the 
next position (‘waypoint’) to which the flight is travelling – can be accessed.  If this 
waypoint data is available for conflict probing then the frequency of false alerts, 
generally caused by simply assuming that the flight is continuing on its present 
course, can be reduced considerably. 
 
R&D people can suffer from the ‘hammer fallacy’, ie ‘I have a hammer, so I see 
everything as a nail’.  Thus, experts on workstation displays see the solution through 
– improved displays.  Experts on pilots and cockpits see the solution as transfer of 
tasks from controllers to pilots.  Satellite navigation experts might well see the key 
ingredient as positional accuracy.  But which of these makes most sense in terms of 
the controller’s workload and the ATC operational concepts in use (compare the 
constraints picture in Section 2)? 
Industry 
Manufacturing firms exist to sell engineering products and make profits from doing 
so.  Some parts of the aviation industry can take a long-term viewpoint, eg aircraft 
manufacturers.  However, the sums have to add up, eg R&D costs have to be 
recovered from sales income; and the rate of return on innovation must – overall – 
exceed the firm’s cost of capital (unless there is subvention from Government).   
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R&D costs are a major problem.  If they are substantial then the production run has 
to be large enough for them to be fully recovered.  If the run is potentially small then 
the unit cost may put the price up to a level that deters buyers (who have to achieve 
savings exceeding the costs of the equipment).  R&D costs that are estimated to be 
very large have a habit of turning out to be even larger in practice, particularly so if 
most of these costs involve software development, testing and integration. 
 
ATC Centres with new software/hardware systems, requiring substantial 
development work, are not that attractive to industry.  The risks of cost overruns are 
high, which inter alia leads to legal/contractual problems and the risks to firms’ 
reputations.  Past European and USA ATC requirements, project management and 
software difficulties are well documented in the literature (but other high technology 
industries have similar problems). 
 
Given the limited number of implementations of ATC Centre software in any one 
country (apart from the USA), it would be poor business practice to develop different 
software in different countries.  So, future ATM software would need – at least – to 
be developed with high confidence that it would be used in several other countries.  
However, this brings up political issues about commercial tendering and ‘national 
champions’ in engineering. 
Safety Analysts 
The phrase ‘safety analysts’ covers a range of different kinds of people and 
responsibilities, some ‘wearing a regulatory hat’.  The common thread is the need to 
demonstrate that a future ATM system will be safe, ie pose risks to passengers that 
are certainly no greater than the present system.  Some of these people will be 
regulators but most will work for ATC providers.  The range of activities involved will 
range from design engineers to risk calculators to human factors experts.   
 
ATM safety is now very good, which means that the targets, processes and 
procedures for changes in ATM have to be very rigorous.  Rigor implies a detailed 
understanding of a new system coupled with numerical targets for performance.  
There are now very few ATM accidents resulting from hardware failure: the major 
concerns are with invalid pieces of software logic and human failures.  The most 
difficult areas are those in which human factors are required.  In particular, the 
understanding of control workload for a new scenario is not straightforward – present 
workload models are crude design tools. 
 
It takes a substantial amount of effort to prove that even a simple (in concept) 
operational change ensures the necessary safety.  An example is Reduced Vertical 
Separation Minimum (RVSM), where a simple change in the separation minimum for 
high-level flights involved many years of data collection and risk modelling.  This is 
the key problem for a new ATM scenario: the safety analysts must do the job 
properly; this takes several years; not everything is known and ‘on the shelf’, so risk 
models must be created and filled with data.   
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Safety analysts are not primarily concerned about the cost of different options.  They 
will test out any option on the same general principles.  Their kind of rational action 
means that exploring multiple possibilities could take a very long time.  People can 
do things in cleverer ways, but there can be no safety shortcuts. 
ICAO 
ICAO does many things, but, in the present context, it is a standards organisation.  
As a country’s ATC has to deal with aircraft from other countries, any major changes 
in ATC have to involve international standardisation.  This generally operates at what 
many would see as a slow pace. 
 
For example, airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) were developed in the 
early and mid 1990s, but were not endorsed by ICAO until 1993 and were not fitted 
to the bulk of commercial aircraft until the end of the decade.  Part of the reason for 
this timescale was the need for the USA to convince other states that the system that 
it was proposing would achieve the necessary safety.  Another factor was the time it 
takes to reequip aircraft: this is usually done when the aircraft is undergoing major 
maintenance rather than just taking it out of service. 
Government 
The role of national Government in ATM has changed considerably over the 
decades.  Once, ATM was a governmental function in all European countries.  Now, 
some ATC providers are privatised or corporatised, and safety and economic 
regulation may be one step removed from Government.  ATM is largely expected to 
pay for itself; indeed elements of en route charges are sometimes used to pay for 
regulation and to contribute to Government costs.   
 
Governments can intervene in ATM for political reasons.  For example, in the 
European Single Sky developments it has been Governments – advised by ATC 
providers and regulators – that have taken the lead in working with the European 
Commission.  Governments can also use ATM as a means of pursuing industrial 
strategy either nationally or internationally, eg instructing (or leaning on) ATC 
providers to agree to cross-European industrial projects. 
European Planning 
ATM planning is one of Eurocontrol’s functions.  The ATM scenario kind of work is 
described in the ATM 2000+ documents.  For the period 2010 to 2015, the aim is for 
the ‘Redistribution of tasks between the human and the machine…between the air 
and the ground, to improve levels of productivity’.  However, the ‘Plan’ at present 
generally consists of a very large technical and operational list of possibilities: no 
particular technical path appears to be completely ruled out. 
 
The difficulty for Eurocontrol is that it is not the single decision-maker.  It is a 
consensus building organization.  It tries to be inclusive and keep options open until 
there is agreement about the way forward.  Its strategic plans are positive intents to 
do ‘something’, but without the financial and business commitment to spend money, 
to buy particular pieces of equipment/software for aircraft and Centres, and to 
change particular operational practices at particular times.  
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4. YOU WERE EXPECTING A CONSTRUCTIVE CONCLUSION? 
Painting the picture of rational actors is one thing, but resolving the major conflicts 
between them is another thing entirely!  A Web search will reveal over a million sites 
on the topic of conflict resolution – which rather indicates the difficultly of the problem 
in society and business.   
 
The most important thing to recognise at the outset is that these are intrinsic conflicts 
between actors with genuinely different interests.  It is not sufficient to suppose that 
(eg) the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces will lead to better ATM systems.  There will 
be monopoly provision of ATC services even with Single Sky ideas. 
 
Conflicts are generally resolved by real negotiations in which there is open 
discussion of the rational actors’ interests, including reasons, needs, concerns and 
motivations.  At some point, it is essential to concentrate on real technical and 
investment choices: all options cannot be kept open indefinitely, to the 
accompaniment by endless ‘analysis paralysis’.  It is essential to focus on a few 
choices that deliver big paybacks on robust assumptions – this may mean that a 
great deal more work is required to get high quality information about benefits and 
costs.  Money will always be a major problem: how can the actors be prevented from 
endless argument about a fixed pot – a zero-sum game? 
 
To break the zero-sum game, could Government, probably at a European level, play 
a much more positive role?  Could it direct regulators to press for strategic changes?  
Could it offer funds at low interest for strategic investment by ATC providers and 
airlines?  These would be investments that delivering benefits to passengers for 
decades hence, currently squeezed out by the short-term cash flow considerations.  
[NB: they would not be funds pumped into manufacturing firms for industrial policy 
reasons.]  Government would put back into decision-making the choices that these 
future passengers would like to make about ATC-related costs.  This would put ATM 
on a level playing field with other transport modes. 
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